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When Publius in the very first paper of The Federalist' challenged
Americans to make conscious political choices, rather than be subject
to chance and drift, he spoke with all the confidence of the new age
of science. Yet his opponents, who were inspired by the same science of
politics and society, were moved to caution. Both sides were in fact
attentive readers of Montesquieu's The Spirit of the Laws2 and like
subsequent generations had emerged with quite different interpreta-
tions. The argument between the two sides involved nothing less than
the sociological possibilities and limits of deliberate political change.
It went far beyond states' rights and centralization, and the ways in
which authority should be allocated between local and national
governments. Then as now federalism had to be considered in terms of
the structure and purposes of government.
The federalists took from Montesquieu not only analyses of the
history of various forms of government, 3 but also encouragement to
design an institutional structure different from any known to the past.
Emboldened by the new science of potitics, they felt sure they could
leave the multiple failures of the past behind them. The anti-federalists
were less confident. They found in Montesquieu lessons of social
complexity that convinced them of the need to proceed slowly by
mending the standing structure.4
t Professor of Government, Harvard University.
1. THE FEDERALIST (J. Cooke ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited to this edition without
reference to editor]. I refer to Publius throughout as a single author without considering
the possible differences among Hamilton, Madison, and Jay in The Federalist. They
chose to speak as one person, and so they should be read.
2. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF TIE LAWS (T. Nugent trans. 1949).
3. In the course of his discussion, Montesquieu entered into speculations about al-
ternative ruling classes. The best, he thought, was a republican aristocracy, non-hereditary,
relatively egalitarian, law-abiding, and above all, moderate; his admittedly idealized pic-
ture of England approximated that model. See id. at 13-15, 23-24, 49-53, 149-62, 307-15. In
1787 there were many public men in America who could recognize themselves as members
of Montesquieu's paradigm class. His work offered justification for their rule, as well
as much useful advice about how liberty and stable government might be combined.
4. Both were perfectly valid interpretations of Montesquieu's work. Indeed, Montes-
quieu had set out to show that men make their own history and that the past could be
understood in terms of general and particular causes. He meant to disabuse those who
still believed that fate or divine providence dominated mankind. Yet, if he did en-
courage political action, he also knew its limits. The ways in which polities alter and
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In any debate each side depends on the other for the quality of the
whole performance and for the issues raised. Publius's excellence, as
well as the subjects he discussed, were to a very large extent determined
by his intelligent and resourceful opponents. That the two parties
were not too far apart, and were able to draw on the same pool of
political ideas, only raised the intense seriousness of the discussion.
And though Publius often stooped to abusing the motives and char-
acter of those who rejected the proposed constitution, he did feel
constrained to offer reasoned replies to their objections. It was not an
easy task. The uneasiness of the anti-federalists was diffuse. They did
not see immediate dangers ahead, but anticipated distant, irreversible
consequences.' It was Publius who saw utter disaster around every
corner threatening the thirteen states. Military danger from abroad,
corruption by foreign agents, and war among the states were immediate
dangers in his view.6 That is why Publius and the federalists gen-
erally were perceived as rash and visionary.7
The anti-federalists did not share Publius's alarm, but instead
focused on the troubles further ahead if the constitution were adopted.
Thus Melancton Smith of New York thought that within 25 years the
new regime would acquire a set tone; then it might begin to alter the
spirit of the people.8 That there was a constant interaction between
the spirit of a government and the character of the people was one of
Montesquieu's chief observations, which he illustrated frequently.9 It
was a lesson not lost on Smith, who argued that, given the undemo-
groups interact in society are extremely complicated and the relations between rulers
and ruled very delicate. Montesquieu was not one to shirk these difficulties, especially
since he believed that not all changes were beneficial. Indeed, he saw France moving
toward despotism. Those of his readers who found his theoretical radicalism tempered
by practical pessimism were not misled.
5. This is my only disagreement with Cecelia Kenyon's excellent introduction to her
edition of anti-federalist writings and speeches. C. KENYON, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS (1966).
Kenyon argues that the anti-federalists expected immediate corruption to befall America.
Id. at lvi. I can find little evidence of this, but am otherwise deeply indebted to her
essay.
6. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST Nos. 4-9, 15, 22.
7. In The Letters of "Philadelphiensis," reprinted in C. KENYON, supra note 5, at 69,
71 [hereinafter cited as Philadelphiensis], the federalists were denominated "aristocratics,
[and] incendiaries" and in The Letters of "John De Witt," reprinted in id. at 89, 105
[hereinafter cited at De Witt] as "young ambitious minds." Richard Henry Lee described
them as "young visionary men." Lee, Letters of a Federal Farmer, reprinted in PAM-
PHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 279, 285 (P. Ford. ed. 1888). Cf.
Winthrop, The Letters of "Agrippa," reprinted in EssAYs ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 72, 81 (P. Ford ed. 1892) [hereinafter cited as ESSAYS] (characerizing sup-
port for proposed constitution as "rash").
8. Debates in the New York Convention, reprinted in C. KENYON, supra note 5, at
370, 388 [speech hereinafter cited as Smith].
9. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 2, at 119, 293-94.
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cratic and centralizing features of the proposed government, it was
likely to create, however slowly, a passive population fit for just such
a rule.
The remoteness, both social and geographic, of the new govern-
ment from the general population frightened the anti-federalists more
than anything else. The men who would be elected to the House of
Representatives from large districts would be far richer, better ed-
ucated, and abler organizers than most of their electors. How could
such atypical men mirror the collective character of their constitu-
encies? Elections could not by themselves mend this gap. Representa-
tives would be far away between elections, gathered in a capital city
where they would soon form a political society all their own, with its
own manners and interests.' 0 The Senate particuarly was seen as a
dangerous cabal, a "small minority" capable of sacrificing an in-
dividual's "dearest rights."" The President would be the head and
patronage fountain of that far-off society and a high-living court cul-
ture was sure to develop around him. It would be a world very dif-
ferent from, and perhaps even hostile to, that of the majority of the
people. Thus, George Clinton quoted Montesquieu's marvelous tirade
against courtiers in full, and with evident feeling.12 Any ruler in-
sulated by a court would be unfamiliar with his subjects and thus
always potentially despotic.
That this was more likely to happen in a large republic than in a
small one was not an abstract mathematical suspicion for either
Montesquieu or his anti-federalist disciples.' 3 A large population was
not likely to have the same mores, and the anti-federalists knew exactly
what the great differences were. The North, according to Richard
Henry Lee, was given to equality, the South was dominated by a
"dissipated aristocracy."' 4 How indeed could a single government suit
both Georgia and Massachusetts? The climate of the South produced
indolent planters, that of the North hard-working townsmen. No one
who had read Montesquieu could be surprised by that.'3 Furthermore,
10. See, e.g., C. KENYON, supra note 5, at Lxxiii n.73 (quoting Patrick Henry); Clinton,
Letters of Cato, reprinted in ESSAYS, supra note 7, at 247, 265, 273; De Wilt, supra note
7, at 100; The Letter of "Montezuma," reprinted in C. KENYON, supra note 5, at 61, 65-67;
Winthrop, supra note 7, at 54, 104.
11. Debates in the Virginia Convention, reprinted in C. KENYON, supra note 5, at 235,
257 (Patrick Henry) [speech hereinafter cited as Henry].
12. Clinton, supra note 10, at 262. For Montesquieu's comments on courtiers, see
NIONTESQUIEU, supra note 2, at 24.
13. De Witt, supra note 7, at 73; Henry, supra note 11, at 254; Philadelphiensis, supra
note 7, at 73.
14. Lee, supra note 7, at 296-97.
15. Winthrop, supra note 7, at 64. For Montesquieu's discussion of extended republics
and the social effects of climate, see MONTESQUIEU, supra note 2, at 126-30, 221-34.
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in New England and Pennsylvania there was considerable distaste for
slavery. Anti-federalists there were not pleased by the three-fifths ratio
that actually favored men "so wicked as to keep slaves."'16 Any govern-
ment that suited one of these sections was bound to be unacceptable
to the other. One or the other or both would feel repressed, ruled by
strangers. To be governed against the grain was a form of dire
coercion. 7 Like Montesquieu, the anti-federalists had a fine sense of
the subjective aspects of freedom. No man could feel secure if he were
governed in an unfamiliar manner and by men who did not respect
his customs.' 8
The failure of the proposed constitution to provide an acceptable
lower house and also to guarantee trial by local juries left the anti-
federalists thoroughly dissatisfied. 19 Here they echoed Montesquieu's
conclusions that the people could not be secure without true repre-
sentation and trial by jury.20 To be an adequate surrogate for in-
feasible direct democracy, the legislative assembly must accurately
mirror the "general will" of the people.2 ' The phrase was Montes-
quieu's well before Rousseau made it famous.2 2 Trial by juries drawn
from the locality, preferably by lot, would assure that judges need
only "open their eyes" to pass judgment according to law and custom.
This was the "fence to secure ... innocence" that was essential if in-
dividuals were to fear only the office, but never the person of the
magistrate.23
Finally, there were a host of local and economic interests that would
suffer under a changed political order. Commercial and landed in-
terests could not readily be reconciled.2 4 The language of self-interests
was as common among anti-federalists as among federalists. It had
largely replaced the older revolutionary rhetoric of civic virtue as
the basis of a free, republican government. Like Montesquieu, most of
the anti-federalists looked to commerce, not virtue, as the best source
16. Smith, supra note 8, at 375. See also Bryan, The Letters of "Centinel," reprinted
in C. KENYON, supra note 5, at 1, 23.
17. Clinton, supra note 10, at 273-74; Lee, supra note 7, at 296-97; Winthrop, supra
note 7, at 64-65, 91-92. See MONTrSQUIEU, supra note 2, at 294-95, 297-99, 332.
18. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 2, at 151-52; Clinton, supra note 10, at 257; Winthrop,
supra note 7, at 76.
19. E.g., Lee, supra note 7, at 315-16; Debates in the Virginia Convention, reprinted in
C. KENYON, supra note 5, at 272-73 (George Mason).
20. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 2, at 151-62.
21. E.g., De Witt, supra note 7, at 107-09; Lee, supra note 7, at 288-89.
22. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 2, at 153.
23. Id. at 153, 184.
24. Winthrop, supra note 7, at 121-22; Debates in the Virginia Convention, reprinted
in C. KENYON, supra note 5, at 286 (William Grayson).
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of modern political attitudes..2 5 They were sure it would unite the states
amicably. If they did not want an extensive republic, they also did not
want warlike polities like Sparta and Rome. Carthage was a more
agreeable model to follow.26 To the extent that Roman history of-
fered guidance, it was in the form of Tacitus's and Sallust's accounts
of imperial decay. Profane and sacred history, with its reminders of
Nimrod, Saul, and the Babylonian captivity, told the same tale-do not
become an imperial power. This was an argument against political
union, but it was more sophisticated than had been the fervent ideology
hurled against Britain.27 Montesquieu had shown the anti-federalists
how to use the past as a source of sociological knowledge, not of
sermons or of civic feeling. They thought about laws of change and
how to adapt them to the contingencies they faced.
Publius simply ignored much of all this. He was convinced that
political science had advanced to a stage where it could be used to
create new institutions of government so unlike those of the past that
history ceased to matter. That science only showed how very different
America was from any of its republican predecessors.2 8 The new
political science could, properly applied, build a self-correcting system
of government that would not suffer any of the infirmities that had
afflicted the older systems.2 9 Odd as it may seem, Publius's master of
that science was Montesquieu. Publius did not choose to respond
directly to many of the sociological issues raised by his opponents.
Perhaps he had no answers, or found the arguments too vague. But
most important of all, he simply did not share the worries of the anti-
federalists. Quite the contrary, he saw entirely different dangers
ahead: the tyranny of the majority, turbulent popular legislatures, the
absence of self-sufficient and authoritative leadership, conflicts among
the states, and lack of prestige in the eyes of the world.30 These were
the calamities that the new constitution was to avert. For, in fact, the
dispersal of power was the cause of each one of them. The economic
25. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 2, at 316-18; Clinton, supra, note 10, at 258; Winthrop,
supra note 7, at 72-73.
26. Winthrop, supra note 7, at 82-83, 93-94. See also A. HiRsCwMAN, THE PASSIONS AND
THE INTERESTS 60-63, 70-80 (1977).
27. Although I owe much. to G. WooD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
471-564 (1972), I see very little "virtuous republican" rhetoric among anti-federalists,
least of all in the South. The only traces of the "old" ideology that I could find were
among some New Englanders, e.g., Winthrop and John De Witt, and those were faint
traces. For a full account of that older Whig ideology, see B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967).
28. THE FEDERALIST No. 14.
29. Id. No. 9.
30. Id. Nos. 4-8, 10, 15, 22, 43, 48, 49, 63.
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torpor induced by local debtor revolts such as Shays's Rebellion 3l and
the prospects of commercial friction between rival states were perhaps
the most immediate threats, but these were only the beginning of
worse possibilities for the Confederation. Unlike Montesquieu and the
anti-federalists, Publius had no faith in the pacifying effects of com-
merce upon republican bellicosity. Commerce was competitive and
had already caused several wars. Doubtless there had been as many
popular as there had been monarchical wars.32 Given these apprehen-
sions, Publius found it difficult to assuage fears so completely at odds
with his own. The result was a certain discontinuity and imbalance.
Publius asked his readers to rely on the "manly" spirit of the people
ever ready to defend its freedoms and interests even as he warned of
the dangerous passions to which they were given. Elected representa-
tives were to be trusted as the protectors of the rights of the citizen,
yet they needed to be checked at every point.33 It was obviously not
easy for Publius to reassure those with whom he disagreed.
In his extraordinary efforts to cope with Montesquieu's inhibiting
sociology, Publius resorted to two primary strategies. He presented
first a picture of American mores, different from that of the anti-
federalists, and then offered an alternate science of stability. Americans
were not divided in their sentiments; religion, feeling, and language
all combined to create a single nation with compatible manners and
ways. 34 Nothing was said about the institutional, social, and economic
differences between Georgia and Massachusetts. Moreover, if one
turned from mores to interests, the social situation looked completely
different. Because economic interests were so numerous and so widely
diffused throughout the population, they created social bonds. To
advance their interests men formed and re-formed coalitions to make
up winning majorities. Because these were so loosely held together
and so impermanent, they did not become oppressive. Nevertheless,
though the ties of interest might shift and change, they would always
be present to hold groups together. In an extensive republic, factions
and parties were sources of cohesion, just as surely as they were divi-
sive in a small republic. There was proof, moreover. The multiplicity
of religious sects in America illustrated how peace emerged from the
prevalence of small, mutually uncongenial groups. When all were
free, there was peace in numbers, even among Protestant sects. It was
31. See id. No. 6, at 31; No. 21, at 131; No. 25, at 162; No. 28, at 177; No. 74, at 502.
32. See id. Nos. 4, 6-8.
33. E.g., id. Nos. 10, 26, 32, 41, 48, 49, 63.
34. Id. Nos. 2, 14.
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a thought that had occurred to Montesquieu and that could now be
taken as proven. 3z The commercial interests pursued by sovereign
states might lead to war, but private economic interests did not come
to such a pass; instead they tended to make for a flexible unity.
Finally, there was a quite different use of the notion of interest that
suggested itself to Publius. Electoral politics, as he observed them in
New York, did not, in fact, yield legislative assemblies that were
miniatures of the society. People voted for those whom they could
trust to do the most on their behalf. That usually meant the most
successful members of the interest group to which they belonged.
Mechanics chose successful businessmen, farmers elected planters, and
everyone voted for members of "the learned professions" whose
"talents and situation" inclined them to enlarged views and enabled
them to balance the competing interest groups. The general will in
actuality did not speak through a body exactly like the electorate, but
was expressed by agents who represented interests that had already
acquired a fair degree of social organization. It worked well enough,
especially as no really able persons need be excluded. The most enter-
prising men could expect to succeed in such a system. 36
This view of the process of government was clearly designed to
replace the anti-federalists' perception of social reality. Where they
saw the divisions created by enduring cultural, regional, and ideo-
logical ties, Publius saw economic interests cutting across them. As far
as electoral politics was concerned that was all that counted. If the
thirteen states became a single electorate, they would structure power
by voting their pocketbooks and so create a stable political system.
Publius offered less an answer to anti-federalist criticisms than an
alternative way of looking at society. To support his propositions,
Publius relied far more on a sophisticated psychological analysis of
political processes than his opponents, who tended merely to feel
gloomy about human nature in general. Such analysis emerged, among
other places, in Publius's discussion of the House of Representatives.
That it should be composed of rich and well-educated men did not in
the least disturb him. Taxation, commerce, and military affairs, the
main business of the House, could only be properly managed by men
of some degree of superiority. Leadership, not mere fellow-feeling,
was required for legislation. To Publius, the fear of large districts was
misplaced. They would create a larger pool of suitable candidates for
election. The rich and clever, being thinly distributed across districts,
35. NIONTESQUIEU, supra note 2, at 308-09, 312-13; THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 51.
36. THE FEDERALIST No. 35, at 219-22; No. 36, at 222-25.
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could not form a cabal, but they would and should be elected in the
spontaneous course of events. There was absolutely no cause for worry
here, given the psychology of the representatives. They would feel
grateful to those who had chosen them and would be eager to please
them in the hope of being re-elected. They were not likely to change
a system to which they owed all their eminence. And, as they must
sooner or later become ordinary citizens again, they would not make
life intolerable for those to whose station they must return. Vanity and
fear, no less than calculation, would keep a representative faithful to
his constituents.3 7
With this psychological perspective Publius could afford to make
light of the anti-federalists' fears of a remote legislature and govern-
ment by men alien to the voters. He was also free to concentrate on
the institutional arrangements that would prevent the touted ill-effects
of these social circumstances. Federalism was the first and foremost
bulwark against decline into a centralized despotism. The numerous
powers of the states, the loyalty of their citizens, their considerable
part in all federal elections, and the limited number of federal powers
were the main arguments. The states had ample resources with which
to curb the central government whenever that might be necessary, and
no federal government would risk arousing their hostility.38 The
anticipation of antagonism was for Publius one of the strongest
political motives, and one of the best. It prevented mischief in advance.
It worked powerfully to make the separation of powers an effective sys-
tem of self-corrective government.
Here Montesquieu's approving remarks were cited to advantage. His
chief contribution to the separation of powers theory was to insist on
the complete insulation of the judiciary from legislative and executive
interference. In Montesquieu's idealized vision of England as a mixed
monarchy, the two Houses of Parliament and the king shared power
so as to mutually restrain each other in its exercise.39 It was not their
apartness, as some had argued, but their ability to check each other
that mattered.
In the new federal constitution the ambition of each department,
the desire to protect its special area of authority against the others, was
bound to prevent any one department from over-stepping its prescribed
bounds. The House's power of the purse, the Senate's role in impeach-
37. rd. Nos. 55-57.
38. Id. No. 9, at 55-56; No. 17, at 105-08; No. 39, at 254-57; No. 45; No. 46, at 315-23.
Cf. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 2, at 126-28 (discussing stability of confederate republican
form of government).
39. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 2, at 151-52.
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ment and participation in appointments, the executive's limited veto,
would be jealously guarded. The whole would be so constricted that
its ability to move beyond the law would be constrained by internal
friction. 40 Finally, the Senate and the President would not be likely to
enter into collusion. As soon as there was a mistaken decision, the
Senators would put all the blame on the President.41 Both would,
after all, live under the scrutiny of the House with its control over the
purse. If the latter tended to act in turbulent haste, the Senate, older,
wiser, and longer-termed, was there to moderate it. How could despotic
rule or a "standing army" emerge from such a system, especially as
the House could only vote military supplies for two years? Where
would the other departments find the means for such enterprises?42
Why worry, as did so many anti-federalists, about Georgian soldiers in
New Hampshire? There would be no oppressive, expensive army at all.
A small House would, moreover, be a particularly democratic body. A
large assembly was not only likely to be disorderly, but also to be
dominated by an internal oligarchy. Here an ill-considered democratic
preference for numerous, small districts would produce an utterly
undemocratic result.43 And indeed this was just the sort of considera-
tion that the anti-federalists overlooked. Unlike Montesquieu, they
were so preoccupied with the social roots of political behavior that
they forgot its intra-governmental manifestations. The "interior struc-
ture of the government" of a republic, as Publius showed, could be
either self-correcting or self-defeating.44 By dwelling on that "interior
structure" Publius could both evade and overwhelm his opponents.
He had his "energetic" government, free of danger.
Publius's psychology did not imply any faith in the moral fortitude
of politicians, though he occasionally made fun of very similar anti-
federalist attitudes. 45 Nevertheless, Publius did have confidence in
elections. The politician's fear of losing his seat was the best guarantee
of republican fidelity. Here the people spoke to good effect and
ensured the ultimately republican character of the polity.46 Elections
supplied everything that political probity was too feeble to achieve.
The indefinite re-eligibility of the executive would prevent sordid
peculation, neglect of duty, and other forms of political depravity.47
40. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47-49, 51.
41. Id. Nos. 66, 76, 77.
42. Id. Nos. 24, 57, 62, 63.
43. Id. No. 58.
44. Id. No. 51.
45. E.g., id., No. 46, at 320-23; No. 49; No. 55; No. 56, at 378-81; No. 60.
46. Id. No. 39, at 250-53; Nos. 52, 57.
47. Id. Nos. 71, 72.
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Re-elected presidents might look monarchical, but they would have
every incentive to behave democratically. The "interior structure"
could put politicians in such a situation that they need only follow
their self-interest to promote the public good. Thus, the people as a
whole could protect itself against its own worst impulses.
Furthermore, the judiciary as guardians of the constitution would
act as an "intermediary" body between the majority and the rights of
minorities. The term was, of course, Montesquieu's, though he had
meant the judiciary to protect the citizens against the king, not them-
selves.48 The importance of such an intervening power remained the
same. For even if the judiciary was as weak and depoliticized as
Montesquieu and Publius claimed it was to be, its authority was con-
siderable. The courthouse was the place where the average citizen was
most likely to feel the force of government. It was here also that
Publius expected the constitution to be defended and interpreted.4 9
There were difficulties. As a cleyer New York anti-federalist, Robert
Yates, had noticed, the constitution was a very ambiguous document,
and in interpreting it the judiciary could become a super-legislature.
Vague law, judge-made law, was certainly not his or Montesquieu's
idea of legal security and protected freedom50 Publius shrugged that
off by observing that it was usual for judges to legislate in cases in-
volving conflicting laws.51 That was not very convincing and it was
not meant to be. Publius wanted the judiciary to create stability and
protect the constitutional structure against encroachment. If the result
was judicial legislation that suited him very well.
Energy and stability were Publius's greatest concerns because his
hopes for America depended on them. If "our situation invites, and
our interests prompt us, to aim at an ascendant in the system of Amer-
ican affairs, ' '52 and if it was really "the fate of an empire"53 that was at
stake, then these qualities really did matter most. Like Benjamin
Franklin, Publius believed that the imperial future had begun even
before the Revolution and that it could and should now be secured.54
Here Publius left Montesquieu behind. Grandeur was not the object
of Montesquieu's science. Nor did the anti-federalists look forward to
48. Id. No. 78; MONTESQUIEU, supra note 2, at 15-18.
49. THE EDERALIST No. 22, at 143-44; No. 78. See MONTESQUIEU, supra note 2, at 153.
50. Yates, The Letters of Brutus, reprinted in C. KENYON, supra note 5, at 323, 334-50.
51. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 524-25.
52. Id. No. 11, at 72.
53. Id. No. I, at 3.
54. See Franklin, Observations Concerning the Increase of Mankind, reprinted in R.
KETCHAM, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 62-71 (1965).
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an empire like that of other nations. 53 Publius, however, was certain
that America had outgrown the intellectual and material forms of the
old world. The science of the past had taught him to put history aside.
Was he right? The answer is surely that both he and the anti-
federalists were right in their worries. There was to be a war between
the states, and centralization did in time come. Perhaps the question
is badly posed. The way one might best look at the debate is to see it
as a single, joint act of founding the republic. Not the final act of
ratification, but the deliberations preceding it made this a political
creation unlike any other. Not a mythical great legislator, nor a junto
but "a revolution . . . by the intervention of a deliberative body of
citizens," 56 had contrived this new constitution, which surely was "an
improvement ... on the ancient mode of preparing and establishing
regular plans of government. ' '1 7 It was an improvement to which the
anti-federalists had contributed as much as Publius and the majority
for whom he spoke so enduringly.
55. De Witt, supra note 7, at 105; Winthrop, supra note 6, at 88-89.
56. THE FEDERLALIST No. 38, at 240.
57. Id. at 241.
1296
Vol. 86: 1273, 1977
The Yale Law Journal




Note & Topics Editor
T. Alexander Aleinikoff







Article &- Book Review
Editors
Scott D. Baskin


























Secretaries to the Editors M. Olive Butterfield, Pamela Willmott
1297

